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Several suits involving the issue of joint and/or mutual
wills have been decided since the writer's paper on Concerted
Wills appeared somewhat over a year ago.' These cases together
with others not commented on in that article are the occasion of
this note.
Some of the problems arising in the cases herein referred to
raise issues respecting the loss of one (where two were executed) ;
the loose use of the terms joint, mutual, reciprocal, or double, and
attempted definitions of the concept; the character of the evi-
dence sought to be used to set up a lost will or to prove its con-
tractual nature; the remedies; the property involved; the com-
bination of testamentary purpose with other purposes in the
same document; and the matter of notice (where the testators
are still alive) as a prerequisite to revocation.
Again the vast majority of cases concern the wills of hus-
band and wife. Two of the cases involve brothersl and in one
the will makers are sisters. A surprising number of them, about
one-third, are cases of joint wills.
(a) Lost Wills. The mere fact that one of two wills is con-
tractual does not generally make the problem of proof different
from that arising in other cases of lost wills. In Brown v.
Johansen3 there -as no sufficient proof that the wills were con-
tractual and as a consequence, the will being lost, it was pre-
sumed to have been revoked.
In one case the husband's will was lost and if it was not
contractual it was presumably revoked. To rebut this presump-
'Evans, Concerted Wills-A Possible Device for Avoiding the
Widow's Privilege of Renunciation (1945) 33 Ky. L. J. 79. See also
Chambers v. Porter, 183 N. W. 431 (Iowa 1921). (Contraet to make
mutual wills by husband and wife, executed after divorce and in-
tended as a settlement of property rights. The husband's lost will
was set up in equity.)
-Wehrle v. Pickering, 106 Colo. 134, 102, P. 2d 737 (1940); Mc-
Lean v. Jones, 90 Colo. 213, 8 P. 2d 261 (1932); Brawn v. Johansen,
69 Colo. 400, 404, 194 Pac. 943 (1920); see also Fagan v. Fisher, 74
Colo. 473, 222 Pac. 647 (1924).
' 69 Colo. 400, 404, 194 Pac. 943 (1920).
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tion, the surviving wife offered evidence to the effect that the
spouse's relations with herself continued to be affectionate and
the same as before the loss. This proof is admissible but was
not of course conclusive that the will was unrevoked and the
further evidence failed to overcome the usual presumption.4 The
holding in the other case is more questionable. In Campbell v.
Car'anaugjh5 the spouses had executed identical wills. When the
wife's will could not be found (both being still alive) the wife
took a carbon copy of her husband's will to a lawyer and re-
quested that new wills be drawn for each, identical with the lost
will and with the carbon copy. A new draft was made of each
instrument which the spouses failed to execute. The court de-
lared that when a person knows his will is lost and fails to make
another, he is presumed to wish to die intestate. That seems to
be erroneous. An inference is clearly to be drawn not only that
the wife did not wish to die intestate but wished to restore the
original will.
(b) Confusiont in Use of Terms. When the testators have
executed only one instrument the spouses recite their wishes suc-
vessively in like or identical terms; one court denies that this
is a joint will and prefers the term "double" will.',
Attempts at definitions seem to be unsuccessful. Thus one
court declares that a will is not a joint will unless it disposes
of property owned concurrently by the testators such as joint
or several or community interest.7 It must be true that usually
the parties will have some community of interest in the prop-
erty" but why may they not thus dispose of property held
separately by them and why may not effect be given to their
wills, as binding upon the survivor, if they were contractual? It
is sometimes asserted that if the wills are reciprocal they are
'Appeal of Spencer, 77 Conn. 638, 60 Atl. 289 (1905).
96 N. J. Eq. 724, 125 Atl. 569 (1923).
"This is literally correct but it does not seem to be significant
whether the will begins "we and each of us" or whether it has two
successive parts each beginning "this is my will." Cawley's Estate,
136 Pa. 628, 20 Atl. 567 (1890). And see Buchanan v. Anderson, 70
S. C. 454, 50 S. B. 12 (1905).
1 Frese v. Meyer, 392 Ill. 59, 63 N. E. 2d 768 (1945); Curry v.
Cotton, 356 Ill. 538, 191 N. E. 307 (1934).
'Ireland v. Jacobs, - Colo.- , 163 P. 2d 203 (1945): Frese
v. Meyer, 392 Ill. 59, 63 N. E. 2d 768 (1945); Curry v. Cotton, 356 Ill.
538, 191 N.E. 307 (1934); Nye v. Bradford, - Tex. -, 193 S.W. 2d 165
(1946).
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conclusively contractual and this rule is applied where the wills
are separate instruments as well as where only one document was
executed by the testators.9
Another court says that a joint will which is reciprocal is
necessarily contractual but that rule is inapplicable where there
are two documents and the contractual quality in that case must
be proved.' 0 Still other courts more realistically hold that there
is no presumption that joint wills are contractual."
(c) The Evidence of Contractual Interest. Where the will
or one of the pair of wills recites that a contract has been made,
there is no difficulty. Thus a document signed by two entitled
"matrimonial and testamentary agreement" may perform the
function of a will if it purports to dispose of property at the
death of the signers and is properly signed, attested and sub-
scribed.'
2
In ilGinn v. Gilroy'3 one will recited an agreement respect-
ing the residue only, and it was held that there was no such
obligation respecting the other provisions. In another case14
the words "it is covenanted that" were regarded as establishing
a contract. The further fact that the joint will was sealed by the
seal of each testator was also held to establish a contract. It
seems difficult, however, to say that equity should enforce an
agreement just because it was under seal.
Where there is no such declaration the evidence must come
from the outside if at all. That suggests the application of the
Statute of Frauds. Assuming that parol evidence is admissible
to prove the contract, the statute may be avoided by the theory
of part performance, the performance consisting of the probate
by the survivor of the other's will and the receipt of benefits
therefrom.35 Some courts still think that the identical character
of the provisions of the two wills, as well as of the date, the
drafter and the witnesses, is some evidence of a contract. 16 Yet
'Brown v. Johansen, 69 Colo. 400, 404, 194 Pac. 943 (1920).
" Frese v. Meyer, 392 Ill. 59, 63 N. E. 2d 768 (1945).
'Ireland v. Jacobs, --- Colo.- , 163 P. 2d 203 (1945); Mc-
Donald v. Polansky, 48 N. M. 518, 153 P. 2d 670 (1944); Nye v. Brad-
ford, - Tex.-----, 193 S.W. 2d 165 (1946).
12 Re Diez, 50 N Y. 88 (1872).
- Ore.-- , 165 P. 2d 73 (1946).
'4 Curry v. Cotton, 356 Ill. 538, 191 N. E. 307 (1934).
Re Doerfer's Estate, 100 Calif. 304, 67 P. 2d 492 (1937); Wehrle
v. Pickering, 106 Colo. 134, 102 P. 2d 737 (1940).
1 Wehrle v. Pickering, 106 Colo. 134, 102 P. 2d 737 (1940).
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a parol agreement to make identical wills, never carried out,
would fall afoul of the statute.
17
Where the evidence shows that the will-makers executed
contractual wills, and one of the wills is lost, the other one has
been introduced in evidence to establish the content of the lost
one.' 8
(d) The Remedy. If the wills were contractual, it is ap-
parent that if the survivor executes a different will, the legatees
of the prior will have an enforceable interest as third party
beneficiaries. 19 This is frequently enforceable as a constructive
trust placed upon the beneficiary of the revoking will.
Perhaps something may be added by way of observing how
not to approach the matter of relief. Thus a bill to construe the
will of the first decedent when the survivor's will is lost or de-
stroyed is an erroneous choice of procedure. 20 A construction
of the will would not necessarily establish its contractual char-
acter, nor show the unjust enrichment of the survivor. Appar-
ently the beneficiaries should first seek to prove that there was a
contract, and that wills were executed in accordance with it and
then offer evidence of the contents of the lost will. The idea of
revocability of a joint will only during the lifetime of both and
only with notice persists in some decisions while if these same
dispositions are made in two wills notice before the death of
either is not necessary to revocability.2 1
The most recent case observed calls for further considera-
tion. In Irelanid v. Jacobs22 the spouses intended to execute a
joint will, each giving to the other his or her entire interest in
the property. There was the further understanding that a trust
should be set up for a pet dog by the survivor's will and the
balance should be used for an educational and charitable pur-
pose. The husband signed the will in the presence of the at-
testers who likewise subscribed it. The wife's signature appeared
there also but she was not present when it was attested and sub-
17McLean v. Jones, 90 Colo. 213, 8 P. 2d 261 (1932); Fagan v.
Fisher, 74 Colo. 473, 222 Pac. 647 (1924).
"Wehrle v. Pickering, 106 Colo. 134, 102 P. 2d 737 (1940).
29re Doerfer's Estate, 100 Calif. 304, 67 P. 2d 492 (1937); Sick v.
Wiegand, 123 N. J. Eq. 239,197 Atl. 413 (1938).
Williams Estate, 101 Colo. 262, 72 P. 2d 476 (1937).
Curry v. Cotton, 356 Ill. 538, 191 N. E. 307 (1934).
'- Colo.- , 163 P. 2d 203 (1945).
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scribed. The wife was the survivor. There had been no effort
on her part to repudiate any obligation arising from the transac-
tion, but unless there was an obligation resting upon her the
property would pass under the Statute of Descent and Distri-
bution. At this point the State's Attorney General conceived it
to be his duty to enforce the trust for public charity. While the
situation appears unique as a problem growing out of a con-
certed will, yet if the spouses had made a contract, it seems
that the Attorney General's position was justifiable.
The court thought that there was evidence of a contract
presented and that there was a promise for a promise. Its
language, however, is somewhat confusing at this point. It says
that no consideration was mentioned in the will. "Having made
no will did she make a contract, and if so when and where?
There was none named in the contract." Here the court as-
sumes that there was a contract but that none was made. In
fact the result that there was no obligation upon her was due
to the fact that the husband could not have taken under her
will if he had survived. That is to say there would not be
mutuality of remedy. Even granting that mutuality of remedy
under the will would be lacking would not the contractual obli-
gation be enforceable by him as survivor, and would that not
reach substantially the same result?
A recent writer 23 makes the criticism above suggested. He
also believes that the husband's will, though giving his entire
estate to the survivor, still created an executory limitation over
to the trustee. The present writer believes that it is simpler as
well as orthodox to urge that she took the property in fee but
under a contractual obligation which should be enforceable in
equity and that there was no legal interest given to the trustee.
The view taken in Sick v. TWiegan d24 was that the survivor was
bound by his promise to a third party beneficiary. It is true,
of course, that there the survivor left a valid will which he
repudiated.
In many cases where there is no will made or contemplated
by the promisor but a mere promise is given to hold according
to oral directions for a beneficiary, two views have been taken.
Sears, Joint and Mutual Wills (1946) 18 RocKY MT. L. REv. 366.
"123 N. J. Eq. 239, 197 Atl. 413 (1938).
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)ihe"- is that the beneficiary of the will does not take free and
vear but that thw property goes back to the estate. Applying
Ithat rule here would it not pass to the trustee under the hus-
band's will ?
Another view is that the oral promise to hold for the bene-
ficiary is enforceable'" and that it carries the property over to
the beneticiary. There would not be the same difficulty here as
arises where the beneficiary is declared orally only. inasmuch
as the wife's will was in writing and the Statute of Frauds might
he said to be satisfied though the Wills Act was not. It may be
noted that where the conveyance is by deed or oral trust for a
beneficiary the g-rantee may take free and clear though he may
bv unjustly enriched.2 7
It seems now that concerted wills may come into wider use
as the suitableness of this device for several purposes comes to
be more broadly understood.
ALvIN E. EVANS
- See re Boyes, 26 Ch. D. 531 (1884).
- See Caldwell v. Caldwell, 70 Ky. (7 Bush) 515 (1870).
-7 Tillman v. Kifer, 166 Ala. 403, 52 So. 309 (1910).
